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Abstract
This paper makes three contributions. First, it presents a theoretical analysis of how
both the civic preference and information aspects of social capital impact on government
performance and turnover, employing a political agency model with both moral hazard
and adverse selection. Second, it presents novel measures of both local government
performance and on social capital at the Italian municipality level, using administrative
data and an online survey respectively. Third, empirical results show that higher social
capital improves government performance, especially in the first term of office, but
also increases turnover of incumbent mayors, as predicted by the theory. The voting
rule predicted by the theory has the feature that the level effect of social capital on
the incumbent vote share is negative, but the interaction between social capital and
performance is positive. Our empirical results also support this prediction.
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1 Introduction
It is now widely accepted that social capital, classically defined by Robert Putnam as “con-
nections among individuals — social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustwor-
thiness that arise from them” (Putnam, 2000) can have an important effect on economic
outcomes. For example, social capital has been shown to strongly correlate with economic
growth (Helliwell and Putnam, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001), trade
(Guiso et al., 2008), well-functioning institutions (Putnam, 2000; Knack, 2002), public ser-
vices outcomes such as educational achievement (Coleman, 1988), and financial markets
(Guiso et al., 2004), health (Wilkinson, 1996), longevity (Putnam, 2000), income equality
(Wilkinson, 1996; Kawachi et al., 1997), child welfare (Coˆte´ and Healy, 2001), economic
achievement through increased trust and lower transaction costs (Fukuyama, 1995), and
financial development (Guiso et al., 2004), corruption and crime (Halpern, 1999; Putnam,
2000; Uslaner, 2002; Buonanno et al., 2009)
In this paper, we focus on one type of outcome that has received relatively little attention;
the effect of social capital on the dual role of elections, which are to provide incentives for
incumbents and to select good politicians for office. This paper makes two contributions in
understanding the link between social capital and the effects of elections.
First, it presents a theoretical analysis with two new features. The first is we allow for
both “preference” and “information” aspects of social capital in the model. Second, our
setting is an infinite-horizon model of both moral hazard and adverse selection, and so can
make testable predictions about equilibrium turnover, as well as performance when in office.1
In both these respects, our theoretical contribution extends existing literature, as explained
in more detail in Section 2 below.2
Our finding is that both the “preference” and “information” channels have similar effects
on incentives and selection. Regarding incentives, as measured by performance when in
office, we predict that this increases with social capital in the first term of office, and can
also increase with higher social capital even in the second term of office.3
Regarding selection, we first derive a “reduced-form” relationship between the probabil-
ity of re-election of the incumbent and social capital and show this to be unambiguously
negative. While not obvious, this has a clear intuition: higher social capital implies that new
1As is well-known, predictions about turnover in two-period models are problematic, as in the second
period, the voter is comparing two “lame ducks”. ((Besley, 2006))
2In brief, key existing papers focus either on the preference channel (Nannicini et al., 2013) or the
information channel (Ponzetto and Troiano, 2018), whereas we look at both. Moreover, our model is one of
both moral hazard and adverse election, so we can make predictions about the effect of social capital on the
re-election of incumbents, not just their performance while in office.
3Incumbents can serve a maximum of two terms, as in Italian municipalities.
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incumbents will be more disciplined and thus the expected benefit of replacing a term-limited
“lame duck” incumbent is higher for the voter. We then derive the “structural” voting rule
that generates this increased turnover. It has the subtle feature that the level effect of social
capital on the vote share is negative, but the effect of the interaction between social capital
and performance is positive.
Our second contribution is empirical. We bring our predictions to the data using original
data on government performance and social capital for Italian municipalities. At the end
of 2013, the Italian government produced performance indicators for over 6,000 municipal-
ities by integrating information provided by official sources with new data generated by a
questionnaire, in which each local authority was asked detailed information for each service
provided. This information was used to construct a performance index which measures how
efficiently each municipality uses its financial resources for the provision of essential services.4
We also use an output index calculated from the same survey, measuring the physical volume
of different services provided.
We also use an innovative measure of social capital, which adjusts for the fact that social
capital in Italy may not be exogenous. Specifically, a potential problem is that social capital
may be higher in municipalities or provinces where governance is better, partly as a result
of that better governance. To avoid this endogeneity problem, we leverage the results of an
online survey. This survey is described more fully in a companion paper, Sgroi et al. (2020),
and shows that the social norms of individuals are strongly determined by the average social
norms of the provinces where they or their relatives, especially their mothers and maternal
grandmothers, were born. We construct measures of social capital based on this maternal
transmission mechanism, which can avoid the endogeneity problem, and employ them as
instruments for a more conventional measure of social capital.
Our empirical findings are as follows. First, regarding performance, we find that the
performance of incumbent mayors is generally higher in municipalities with higher social
capital, and that this effect is stronger when incumbent mayors are not term-limited. We
see the same effects for the output index. This is as predicted by our theory, and is to our
knowledge, the first study to show that the efficiency with which goods and services are
delivered is related to social capital. From the theory, the positive interaction between social
capital and the first term implies that the effect of social capital on discipline dominates its
effect on selection.
Second, as predicted by the theory, that the unconditional probability of retaining office
4The calculation of these indices in based on the gap between standard and actual expenditure for each
service. This provides a good reference point to judge the level of expenditure of each municipality against
the level of expenditure of other local authorities.
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(i.e. not conditional on performance) is robustly lower in municipalities with high social
capital. Finally, we estimate the vote share equation and find that also as predicted by the
theory, the level effect of social capital on the incumbent vote share is negative, but the
interaction effect with performance is positive.
2 Related Literature
First, we contribute to the theoretical literature on social capital and elections, in particular
Nannicini et al. (2013) and Ponzetto and Troiano (2018). Our model is quite different from
Nannicini et al. (2013) in two major respects. First, in their set-up, there is no adverse
selection i.e. politicians do not differ in unobservable type. In fact, all politicians are “bad”,
that is, rent-seeking. This means that their model does not generate predictions about how
the probability of re-election varies with social capital. Indeed, in their model, the incumbent
is always re-elected in equilibrium. Second, they assume that social capital influences politics
only through the preference channel, i.e. that voters with high social capital have more
altruistic or civic preferences. Reflecting this difference in assumptions, the main prediction
of their model is also different. They predict that with low social capital, incumbents get
higher rents.
Ponzetto and Troiano (2018) study the effect of the information channel. Specifically, low
social capital voters do not observe a public investment good set in a given year (education
in their model) until after the election in that year. This creates biased incentives for the
incumbent; provision of a public consumption good, which is observable prior to the election,
has a relatively higher electoral return than does the investment good, so politicians under-
provide the investment good, and this bias is worse, the greater then proportion of low-social
capital voters. Their political agency model is embedded in a growth model, so in the end
higher social capital raises the growth rate. A limitation of their model, relative to ours, is
that ex ante, all incumbents are identical and policy is chosen before an incumbent-specific
productivity shock is drawn. As a result, there is no scope for incumbents to signal their type.
If stationarity is assumed, as Ponzetto and Troiano (2018) do, this leads to the conclusion
that the probability of the incumbent retaining office in equilibrium is just one half.
So, our theory extends both these papers in two ways. First, we allow voters to dif-
fer in both the civic preference and information aspects of social capital. Second, we allow
for asymmetric information between politicians and voters, which gives rise to testable pre-
dictions of how the probability of retaining office varies with social capital measures. As
emphasized in the introduction, this is an issue of equal importance to how social capital
affects performance once in office.
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Second, our main empirical results contribute to the literature on the correlations between
social capital and the behaviour of politicians while in office. For example, Nannicini et al.
(2013) show that in parliamentary districts of Italy with higher social capital, incumbent
representatives have lower absenteeism rates and are less likely to face accusations of criminal
wrong-doing. We focus not on the personal conduct of incumbents, but on actual policy
achievements when in office. In this respect our results are more similar to Padro´ i Miquel et
al. (2015), who show that that Chinese villages with higher social capital experienced larger
increases in public goods after the introduction of elections, and Ponzetto and Troiano (2018),
who show that there is a positive relationship at the country level between social capital and
spending on education. However, our results are not just about the level or type of public
goods, but also about the efficiency with which they are provided. To our knowledge, this
is the first paper to show that social capital increases the efficiency by which government
spending is transformed into outputs.
Third, a distinctive feature of our paper is that it focuses both theoretically and empiri-
cally on the effect of social capital on the effectiveness of elections as a selection device, by
developing and testing the hypotheses about incumbent turnover and vote share described
above. These results relate to the findings of Nannicini et al. (2013), who consider how
the probability of re-election of Italian parliamentary representatives varies with personal
conduct while in office (absenteeism, accusations of criminal wrong-doing). However, there
are three differences. First, the results of Nannicini et al. (2013) concern personal conduct
while in office, whereas our results concern the provision of services and taxation, which is
arguably of greater significance for society. Second, the empirical relationships Nannicini
et al. (2013) test for, are not predicted by their theory, which only predicts that the vote
share for the incumbent is (weakly) increasing in social capital.5 Third, our finding that the
turnover of incumbents is increasing in social capital is the opposite finding to theirs.
Our work also relates to a small literature on the determinants of government efficiency
(Asatryan and De Witte, 2015; Coffe´ and Geys, 2005; Geys, 2006; Geys et al., 2010; Knack,
2002) The closest to our work are Knack (2002) and Coffe´ and Geys (2005). Both of these
relate measures of social capital to measures of the quality of government, for US states
and Flemish municipalities respectively. Our work arguably has advantages to both these
studies. First, we use a very precise measure of local government performance based on an
administrative survey. Geys (2006) simply use municipal deficits as a measure of efficiency,
which is not clearly related to the usual definition of government efficiency. Knack (2002)
5Specifically, empirical specifications (10) and (11) in their paper have an interaction term between
personal conduct measures and social capital which is not implied by their theory; all that the theory
predicts is that the level effect of social capital on the dependent variables in (10) and (11) should be
positive.
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use a measure based on a very large number (35) of criteria, some of which do not relate
at all to expenditure and service provision, so their measure is much less precisely targeted
than ours. Second, unlike these papers, we have panel data, allowing us to look at the effect
of the electoral cycle on efficiency,
Because one of the channels by which social capital works is information, our paper also
relates to the literature on how improved information (typically via the mass media) impacts
on election outcomes. The closest related paper here is (Besley and Prat, 2006), which shows
that in a pure adverse selection setting, better information for voters leads to higher turnover
of incumbents. When they introduce moral hazard into their model, in the form of a decision
as to how much rent to extract, the effect of information on turnover becomes ambiguous,
because a bad incumbent may moderate rent extraction in response to the voter having more
information. This kind of response also occurs in our setting. The reason why we obtain an
unambiguous result is that our model is an infinite horizon one, and so at the election, the
voter, rather than facing the choice between two “lame ducks”, can replace the incumbent
with a challenger who is motivated, as he himself faces a future election.
Finally, we contribute to the large literature on the measurement of social capital and
its correlation with other related variables.6 Typically, social capital is measured either
through the use of survey questions about trust and social norms on cooperation such as
the World Value Survey (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Knack, 2002) or by the use of data on
behaviours associated with social capital, such as blood donation or electoral turnout (Guiso
et al., 2004; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Nannicini et al., 2013), participation in voluntary
associations (Putnam et al., 1993) or the payment of low-stake, low-enforcement taxes such
as the TV licence (Bracco et al., 2015). Our leading measure of social capital combines
these traditional measures and adds to it through a bespoke survey. The results of this
survey show that measures of social capital at the individual level are strongly correlated
with the social capital of the provinces where individuals or their relatives, especially their
mothers and maternal grandmothers, were born. Leveraging this, we are able construct a
social capital measure that is more exogenous to the local environment.
3 A Theoretical Framework
3.1 Social Capital, Civic Preferences, and Political Knowledge
Our theoretical approach will model two mechanisms by which social capital can affect
government behaviour, civic preferences and political knowledge. Here, to motivate our
6Our contribution to measurement is the main focus of our companion paper Sgroi et al. (2020).
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approach, we briefly report on evidence from our survey which shows a positive association
between the usual measures of social capital and these two mechanisms.7
As already remarked, most classic definitions of social capital emphasise two aspects; trust
and norms of cooperation. In Table 1 below, we show that trust and norms of cooperation,
as measured in a variety of ways in our survey, are correlated with both: (i) willingness to
contribute to public goods and (ii) political knowledge. In the survey, we measure preferences
for public goods by the individual’s contribution to a standard public good game. For
political knowledge, we use two indicators, the self reported level of interest in politics and
the survey response that reading newspapers is the main source of political information.
We measure trust and norms of co-operation in various ways, using questions similar to
those asked in the World Value Survey and the Eurobarometers. First, we ask respondents
to self report the level of trust towards family members, friends, neighbours, people with
roots from the same town, people residing in the same neighbourhood, town etc. We also
include questions on respondents’ beliefs in the overall level of trust, honesty and cooperation
in people. We also try to assess trust in a less direct way by asking what is the likelihood
that a wallet with 200 Euros left on a bus will be returned. Table 1 is quite striking in
that it shows that almost all these measures have a significant positive association with our
measures of willingness to contribution to public goods and political knowledge.
We take these correlations as indicating that two mechanisms by which social capital
might effect voter behavior are via civic preferences and political information. In the model
that follows, we show how these two mechanisms determine government performance when
in office, and government turnover.
7For details on the survey see Section 5.1.2.
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Table 1: Correlations between Willingness to Contribute to Public Good, Political Knowl-
edge and Civic Attributes
Correlations PG
Contribution
Interest in
Politics
Press
Information
Agree: most people are honest 0.108*** 0.150*** 0.089***
Agree: most people try to help 0.082*** 0.112*** 0.065**
Agree: most people can be trusted 0.074*** 0.113*** 0.091***
Trust Family 0.021 0.016 0.102***
Trust Friends 0.067*** 0.01 0.081***
Trust Neighbours 0.089*** 0.109*** 0.098***
Trust Strangers 0.065** 0.185*** 0.03
Trust People of his/her own town 0.069*** 0.119*** 0.087***
Trust Italians 0.049* 0.151*** 0.089***
Wallet Missing 0.093*** 0.126*** 0.079***
Volunteering 0.084*** 0.087*** 0.042*
Notes: * = p < 0.1, **= p < 0.05, *** = p < 0.01. Data are collected from a survey conducted
in April 2019 among 1549 Italian respondents living in Rome, Milan, and Turin. See Sgroi et al.
(2020) for more information on the survey. “PG contributions” are the individual contributions
toward a public good; the values are between 0 and 20 Euros, “Interest in Politics” is the self
reported level of interest in politics and current affairs, [0 indicates no interest in politics and 10 to
high interest], ”Press Information” is a dummy variable taking value of 1 if the self reported main
political information channel is newspaper readership. “Agree” is equal to 1 if the respondent agrees
with the statement and 0 otherwise. The “Trust” variable refers to the level of trust in each of
the above groups, from 0 no trust to 5 high trust. ”Wallet missing” indicates the answer to the
following question: “Imagine you have left your wallet with 200 Euros on the bus, from 1 to 10,
(1= completely unlikely , 10 =almost certain) how would you evaluate the likelihood that it will be
returned? “Volunteering” is a score from 0 to 22 indicating the levels of membership of, monetary
contributions to, and activities in voluntary associations.
3.2 Set-Up of the Model
There are an infinite number of periods t = 1, 2.. In each period, an incumbent politician
provides two consumption goods, A and B, to different groups in the population as described
below. Each good is produced via the production function
git+1 = et + T
i
t , i = A,B (1)
where git is the level of the public good i at period t, et is the effort level of the incumbent, and
T it is tax revenue allocated to the production of good i. The government budget constraint
requires that total tax revenue, Tt, is divided between the production of goods A and B i.e.
Tt = T
A
t + T
B
t .
Note that there is a time-lag in the production of each public good. This captures lags
between resources devoted to improvements in public services, and outcomes. In this context,
there are several interpretations of et, as Italian municipalities provide a variety of services.
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For example, if the public good is nursery school education, one can think of et as the effort
made in recruiting additional workers, finding additional premises, etc. This will lead to an
improvement in services, but with a time lag.
There is an election at the end of every period, where the incumbent faces a challenger.
Each politician can serve for at most two periods i.e. there is a two-term limit, the rule
which applies to most municipalities in Italy.
The are overlapping generations of citizens, each of whom live for two periods. Each
generation comprises a continuum of size one, of two equally sized demographic groups.
Group i consumes only good i, but may have concerns for the welfare of the other group.
Specifically, within a period, every citizen, young or old, in group i has a payoff from the
public goods and taxes of the form
u(git) + θ˜u(g
j
t )− Tt (2)
where the utility from the public good is strictly increasing and concave, and she discounts
future payoffs by δ. Our first measure of social capital is θ˜, which measures concern for the
welfare of others, or civic preferences, as in Nannicini et al. (2013). The idea is that even
though civic-minded citizens may not personally consume good i - for example, education -
they place some weight on the welfare of others who do consume it.
Our second way of modelling social capital is in terms of knowledge about the activities
of government. We will capture this by assuming that while all citizens observe taxes Tt at
t, each citizen observes et before the election at time t with probability 0 < σ < 1. The event
that et is observed also independent across voters at a point in time, and across time.
8 The
modelling of the knowledge aspect is very similar to Ponzetto and Troiano (2018).9
We will assume that at any election, only the young citizens vote. This is without real
loss of generality, as old citizens do not care about next period’s fiscal policy. When voting,
young citizens evaluate the incumbent on the basis of both policy and non-policy preferences.
Specifically, a citizen will vote for the incumbent i iff
V inc + vj + ω ≥ V (3)
Here, V inc, V are the continuation policy payoffs for a citizen from electing the incum-
8If et is not observed before the election at t, it can be eventually backed out in t+ 1 as gt+1 is observed
in the next period. But, by then the information conveyed by et will be useless, as that politician, if he won
the election at t, will have to retire at the end of t+ 1 anyway.
9In Ponzetto and Troiano (2018), there are two types of voters, informed and uninformed. Our model
can also be interpreted in this way i.e. the mathematics of the model is the same if we suppose that a
fraction σ of the voters always observe effort, and a fraction 1− σ do not.
8
bent and challenger respectively, and vj, ω are individual and aggregate preference shocks,
as in Persson and Tabellini (2002). We assume that vj, ω are distributed uniformly on[
− 1
2φ
, 1
2φ
]
,
[
− 1
2γ
, 1
2γ
]
respectively. Note that V inc will depend on whether the voter observes
effort or not, as explained below.
There is a large pool of politicians, who can be good (g) or bad (b). We write it ∈ {g, b}
for the type of the incumbent at time t. The ex ante probability of any politician being good
is pi. All politicians have a cost of effort c(et), where c(0) = 0, and c
′(e), c′′(e) > 0, e >
0. Politicians differ in their preferences. Good politicians have the same payoff from tax and
the public good as the voters, but also incur the effort cost. Other than the cost of effort,
the bad type cares only about rent from office, R > 0; this captures the salary and any other
pecuniary or non-pecuniary benefits from office.
The order of events within a period is as follows. First, the incumbent chooses et, g
A
t , g
B
t , Tt.
Then, all voters observe Tt and observe et with probability σ.
10 Then, if the incumbent is in
his first term of office, the voter votes for the incumbent or a challenger. If the incumbent
wins the election, he serves for another period. If he loses, he is replaced by a challenger. If
the incumbent is in his second term of office, he is replaced by a challenger randomly drawn
from the distribution.
3.3 Discussion
The key feature of our model is that all voters are characterized by a pair (θ˜, σ) measuring
the preference and knowledge aspects of social capital respectively. Apart from the modelling
of social capital, this is quite a standard political agency model with both moral hazard and
adverse selection. It has been constructed to match the Italian institutional setting and data.
For example, we assume two-term limits for politicians, and the incumbent chooses a variable
et that corresponds to the performance index discussed in Section 5.2. However, several
features of the model, which appear at first sight to be complications, deserve comment.
First, following Besley (2004), we assume an infinite horizon, rather than two periods,
to avoid the unrealistic feature of two-period models that in the election at the end of the
first period, the voter has to choose between two “lame duck” candidates each of whom
can only serve one more term. Instead, our set-up allows the voters to choose between the
term-limited incumbent and a challenger who can serve two terms.11
10Before the election at t, voters also observe gt−1, but this has no bearing on their voting decision as it
conveys no information about the type of the current incumbent in his first term.
11An overlapping generations structure is sufficient for this choice, as at any election, young citizens will
look forward by one period. Our results can also extended - at the cost of considerably more algebra - to
the case of infinitely lived voters. These are available on request.
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We introduce probabilistic voting for a number of reasons. First, it is more realistic; it
allows voters to trade off policy payoffs against other considerations when voting. Second,
and more importantly, probabilistic voting provides the mechanism by which the civic pref-
erence parameter affects electoral incentives. As explained in more detail below, a voter with
a higher θ will value high effort more, and thus have a stronger preference for re-electing an
incumbent who she believes is good. This stronger policy preference is weighed against the
non-policy preference in a smooth way by probabilistic voting. A third reason is that with-
out probabilistic voting, the re-election probability for the incumbent, and other outcomes,
will generally depend in an arbitrary way on how we break indifference ties for uninformed
voters.12
3.4 Equilibrium
An equilibrium of the model is a series of actions and voting decisions such that voters use
the Bayes’ rule and both voters and politicians optimize. We will focus on equilibria in which
the actions of politicians are time invariant, depending only on the state of the world, the
type of the politician, and the term that the politician is serving.
The Good Incumbent
At time t, a good incumbent politician wants to maximize voter welfare, minus the cost of
effort. The former is the simple average of the two payoffs in (2) i.e.
θ(u(gAt ) + u(g
B
t ))− Tt, θ =
δ(1 + θ˜)
2
(4)
Moreover, combining (1) and the government budget constraint, we see that
Tt = g
A
t + g
B
t − et (5)
12For example, without probabilistic voting, and assuming that voters have no non-policy preference
between the incumbent and challenger, we can suppose that half of the uninformed voters will vote for the
incumbent. Then, the share of votes for the incumbent would be (1 − σ)0.5 + σI[e=e∗], where I[e=e∗] is an
indicator variable that is 1 if and only if e = e∗. So, whatever σ, the probability of winning the election
will be 1 if e = e∗, and zero otherwise. Alternatively, if we follow Besley (2006), Chapter 3.4.2 and suppose
that if indifferent, uninformed voters always vote for the incumbent, the share of votes for the incumbent
would be (1− σ) + σI[e=e∗]. Now, if σ < 0, 5, there is no electoral penalty for low effort, but if σ > 0.5, the
probability of winning the election will be 1 if e = e∗, and zero otherwise.
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Then, combining (4), (5), we see that in period t, the good incumbent will always choose
et, g
A
t+1, g
B
t+1 to maximize
θ(u(gAt ) + u(g
B
t ))− (gAt+1 + gBt+1 − et)− c(et)
This implies a choice of public good and effort of gAt+1 = g
B
t+1 = g
∗, et+1 = e∗ where
θu′(g∗) = 1, c′(e∗) = 1
So, the level of each public good is determined independently of the cost of effort; a lower
cost of effort will simply reduce the tax, which is of marginal benefit of unity to the voters.
Also, note that as both goods are provided at the same level, total tax revenue is split equally
between the two goods. From now on, we concentrate on equilibria where bad incumbents
also set Tt = T
∗, where T ∗ ≡ 2g∗ − e∗ is the tax set by the good incumbent, and split the
tax between the two goods equally. As tax revenue does not affect the payoff of the bad
politician directly, and bad incumbents have an incentive to imitate good ones whenever it
is costless to do so, this is without real loss of generality.
Voters
The analysis of voter behaviour is straightforward but somewhat lengthy, and the details
are in the Appendix. Here, we just present the relevant outcome for the incumbent i.e.
the probability of re-election, conditional on effort. As a preliminary, we define u0, the
baseline level of voter utility from an incumbent who makes zero effort, and ∆u, the voter’s
utility gain from the incumbent who makes efficient effort. As assumed above, both of these
hypothetical incumbents set the efficient tax and divide it equally between the two goods.
These are, respectively:
u0(θ) ≡ 2θu(T ∗(θ)/2)− T ∗(θ), ∆u(θ) ≡ 2θ(u(e∗ + T ∗(θ)/2)− u(T ∗(θ)/2)) (6)
Note that as long as u is not too concave, the utility increment ∆u will be increasing in
θ, the preference measure of social capital. We will make this assumption in what follows;
it amounts to assuming that voters with higher social capital in the preference dimension
care more about the level of effort made by their elected representative, and as such, seems
intuitive. In what follows, we suppress the dependence of u0,∆u on θ unless necessary.
Then, it is easily computed (see the Appendix) that the probability of the incumbent
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winning, conditional on a choice of e is
p(e) =
1
2
+ γ (u0 + pi∆u− V ) + γσ∆u(Pr(i = g |e)− pi), (7)
Here, as above, V is the the per period continuation value to the voter from appointing a
new incumbent.13
This is a key equation. The first term of one-half reflects the fact that ignoring policy
preferences, any voter is equally likely to prefer the incumbent or the challenger. The second
term is proportional to the net benefit of retaining the incumbent if the voter believes that
the incumbent is good with probability pi. If such an incumbent is retained, the payoff in
the following period is u0 + pi∆u, but if replaced, the payoff is V . Generally, with forward-
looking voters, V > u0 + pi∆u, because if the incumbent is replaced by a new challenger,
the latter faces electoral discipline, which benefits the voter.14 As we shall see, this creates a
channel where changes in the social capital parameters σ, θ affect V and thus the probability
of re-election for a fixed effort level e.
Finally, in the third term, Pr(i = g |e), is the informed voter’s posterior belief that the
incumbent is good, conditional on observing effort level e. So, the “reward” offered by the
voter for high effort by the incumbent depends on both the quality of voter information (i.e.
σ) and the strength of voter civic preferences (i.e. ∆u). This is intuitive; a voter will reward
the incumbent for effort only if she cares about effort, and she observes the outcome of the
effort.15
Equilibrium
To complete the description of equilibrium, we need to consider the bad incumbent. If a
bad incumbent is term-limited, he clearly sets et = 0. If a bad politician is non-term limited,
he has two options that dominate all the others. The first is to pool with the good type
by setting et = e
∗. The second is to set et = 0, and accept the electoral consequences as
described by (7). It is a standard exercise to characterise the conditions under which either
of these two options is chosen. In fact, it turns out that there are a range of paramater
values where the bad incumbent must randomise between the two options.
Generally, let λ be the probability that the bad incumbent pools; this measures the
discipline effect of elections. Also, Define A = c(e
∗)
δRγ
, and a composite measure of social
13Clearly, V is endogenous; an explicit formula for V is is presented and discussed below.
14In a two-period model, by contrast, both challenger and incumbent are ”lame ducks” and so v ≡
u0 + pi∆u, which closes down this channel.
15Note that γ measures the sensitivity of voting decisions to policy payoffs. We assume that γ is small
enough so that 0 < p(e) < 1.
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capital, s ≡ σ∆u(θ). We then have the following characterisation of equilibrium, proved in
the Appendix;
Proposition 1 There exists an equilibrium where (i) if s ≤ A, only good incumbents
choose et = e
∗ and bad incumbents choose et = 0; (ii) if s ≥ Api , all incumbents choose
et = e
∗; (ii) if A ≤ s ≤ A
pi
, the bad politician chooses et = e
∗ with probability
λ =
pi
1− pi
(
σ∆u(θ)
A
− 1
)
, (8)
and et = 0 otherwise; (iii) incumbents who set et = e are re-elected with probability p(e), as
defined in (7). Consequently, electoral discipline λ is increasing in both measures of social
capital σ, θ.
We see that there are three possible regimes, depending on the two social capital measures.
Without further parameter restrictions all three regimes can occur. Across all regimes, both
measures of social capital unambiguously improve electoral discipline. It is important to
understand how such very different measures of social capital can have such similar effects.
The intuition comes from inspection of the term on the conditional probability in (7) i.e.
σ∆u. This tells us that voters are responsive to the level of effort firstly only when they
observe it (which occurs with probability σ), and conditional on that event, when high effort
is important to them in payoff terms, as measured by ∆u.
3.5 Empirical Predictions
Our main interest in the theory is to develop empirical predictions about performance of the
incumbent over the two terms of office, the voting rule used by the voters, and the probability
of retaining office at the end of the first term. It is convenient to begin with the probability
of retaining office for the incumbent, not conditional on performance, denoted p.
Specifically, p is the expected value of p(e) across both equilibrium effort levels, e∗ and
0, and so is:
p ≡ (1− pi)(1− λ)p(0) + (pi + (1− pi)λ)p(e∗) (9)
To proceed, we can substitute out p(e∗), p(0) using (7). This gives
p =
1
2
+ γ (u0 + pi∆u− V ) (10)
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Note that the term in Pr(i = g |e) in (7) disappears, as p is the unconditional probability of
re-election i.e. not conditional on effort, e. This still leaves the undefined term V , which is
the expected payoff in the next period to a voter of a new incumbent. In turn, V is simply
the expected payoff generated by a new incumbent in his first term of office:
V = u0 + pi∆u+ (1− pi)λ∆u (11)
This comprises a baseline payoff u0 + pi∆u, which would be the payoff if the bad incumbent
does not pool, plus a second term which reflects the fact that electoral incentives discipline
bad incumbents by inducing some of them to pool in their first term of office i.e. λ > 0.
Then, combining (7), (11), (9), we get
p =
1
2
− γ(1− pi)λ∆u(θ) (12)
This shows p as a function of both social capital parameters and λ, which also depends
on these parameters. The second term in (12) again measures the discipline effect. It is then
straightforward to combine (12) with the characterization of λ in Proposition 1 to prove the
following:
Proposition 2 If s ≤ A, p is is independent of σ, θ. If s ≥ A
pi
, p is strictly decreasing in θ,
and independent of σ. If A ≤ s ≤ A
pi
, then p is strictly decreasing in both θ, σ.
So, looking across all three regimes, and recalling that s = σ∆u(θ), we see that the
probability of re-election p is decreasing in both the preference and knowledge measures of
social capital. The intuition for this result is simply that both of these measures improve
discipline in equilibrium, which other things equal, makes it more attractive for a voter to
replace the “lame duck” incumbent with a new, disciplined challenger. We call this the lame
duck effect in what follows.
It is important to note that Proposition 2 gives us a reduced-form relationship between
p and the social capital parameters. We now investigate further by analysing the “struc-
tural” voting rule that generates the reduced-form relationship. This voting rule will also be
testable. It is easy to compute (see Appendix) that the share of the vote for the incumbent
as a function of effort can be written in the form of a level, plus an interaction effect in effort:
x(e) =
1
2
− φ∆u((1− pi)λ+ piσ) + φσ∆u(θ) Pr(i = g |e) (13)
Moreover, in equilibrium, there are only two levels of performance, e∗ and 0, with Pr(i =
g |e∗ ) > Pr(i = g |0). So, from inspection of from (13), we can state the following:
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Proposition 3 The interaction between the preference and knowledge measures of social
capital, σ, θ and effort e has a positive effect on the incumbent vote share. Holding the
interaction effect fixed, the level effect of social capital measures σ, θ on the incumbent vote
share is always strictly negative.
The intuition is clear from (13). The interaction effect is clearly positive, because voters
reward the incumbent more for higher effort, (a) the more they are informed about policy,
and (b) the greater the probability they observe effort. As for the negative level effect of
social capital, this is due to the lame duck effect as defined above.
We now turn to predictions about performance in the first and second period of office.
As already observed, the model has been specified so that the theoretical equivalent of our
empirical performance measure is the difference between g and T, i.e. e. Expected effort in
the first period of office is
e1 = (pi + (1− pi)λ)e∗ (14)
Clearly, e1 is increasing in λ and thus both measures of social capital. Expected effort
in second period of office is e∗ if the incumbent is good, conditional on winning the election,
and zero otherwise:
e2 = Pr(i = g |win)e∗ (15)
Here, Pr(i = g |win) is the probability of being good conditional on winning. By Bayes’ rule;
Pr(i = g |win) = p(e
∗)pi
p
=
(
1 +
γpi
p
(1− pi)(1− λ)
pi + (1− pi)λ σ∆u(θ)
)
pi (16)
where at the second step, we have substituted out p(e∗) using (7), (12). Using this expression,
we can establish conditions under which e2 is increasing in our social capital measures. These
are given in Proposition 4 below, which summarizes our results on performance in both
periods.
Proposition 4. Expected performance in the first period of office is increasing in both
measures of social capital, θ and σ. If s ≤ A, expected performance in the second period
of office is increasing in both measures of social capital, θ and σ.If s ≥ A
pi
, second-period
performance is independent of σ but still increasing in θ. If A < s < A
pi
, then second-period
performance is strictly increasing in z = σ, θ if
− z
p
∂p
∂z
>
s
A
pi − s
(17)
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The intuition is as follows. The results for first-period performance are entirely straight-
forward; both measures of social capital increase discipline and thus performance. The case
of second-period performance is more subtle. From (16), when (say) σ changes, there will
be a direct positive effect on e2 via p(e
∗), capturing the fact that better voter information
will raise the probability of re-election of the high-effort incumbent. There is also an indirect
effect in the same direction via the fact that an increase in σ generally reduces p. Against
this needs to be set the fact that an increase in σ increases λ, and an increase in λ reduces
p(e∗), as it reduces the probability that a high-effort incumbent is good. So, to ensure that
the last effect does not dominate, the elasticity condition (17) is required.
Finally, looking ahead to the empirics, we might ask whether first period effort e1 is
greater than second-period effort e2, and whether this difference is increasing in social capital.
Generally, the sign of e1−e2 is ambiguous, because from (14), e1 is higher than baseline effort
pie∗ due to the discipline effect, λ, whereas from (15), e2 is higher than same baseline due
to the selection effect i.e. Pr(i = g |win) > pi. The same is true of the interaction between
e1 − e2 and social capital. Here, if we find a positive interaction effect on performance, this
tells us that the effect of social capital on boosting discipline, is greater than any effect on
selection.16
4 The Institutional Setting
We test our theory using a dataset on Italian municipalities. Italy provides a good setting to
test the predictions of our model for a number of reasons. First, there are striking cultural
differences across Italian regions and provinces due to the lasting effects of centuries of foreign
domination by different powers. These differences are part of everyday life and include the
use of language and dialects, food, traditions and common habits. Second, there is evidence
of a large variation in the performance of sub-national governments, as explained in more
detail in Section 5.2 below.
Third, Italian municipalities, comuni, enjoy a relative high level of fiscal autonomy both
in term of tax setting as well as in spending decisions; they are ruled by a city council
(consiglio comunale) and a directly elected mayor (sindaco),17 who appoints the members of
the executive committee (giunta comunale), to which he or she delegates tasks. Municipal
16We can be more specific about conditions under which each occurs. If s ≤ A or s ≥ Api , λ is fixed, so
only the election channel is at work, and so the effect of social capital on e1 − e2 is negative. If A < s < Api ,
then the discipline effect can dominate if p is not too responsive to the social capital parameter.
17Mayors are elected through a simple plurality rule in small municipalities (below 15,000 inhabitants)
and through a runoff system in large municipalities (above the 15,000-inhabitants).
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legislatures last for five years and mayors are subject to a two-term limit.18 Municipal
governments have power over land management and environment (water, sewage, public
hygiene), local transport, local police, culture and recreation, education (nursery schools,
training programmes) and also have discretionary powers on how much fiscal revenue to
raise.
On average, around than 80% of fiscal revenues come from own taxes, or shared taxes
and fees, with more than 30% coming from a property tax, and the remaining 20% from
intergovernmental grants from upper tiers of government. The property tax is most salient
source of fiscal revenue, and each municipality can decide the tax rate within statutory limits
sets centrally (see for example Bracco, Porcelli and Redoano, 2019b). Resident home-owners
are generally exempted orface a lower tax rate than owners of second (rented or holiday)
homes or businesses. Municipalities may also decide to apply a surtax on the personal income
tax rate between 0 and 0.8%.
5 Measuring Social Capital and Local Government Per-
formance
5.1 Measuring Social Capital
Social capital, both in Italy and elsewhere, has been measured in two main ways (Guiso et
al., 2008; Cartocci, 2007; Bracco et al., 2015; Nannicini et al., 2013). First, there are direct
survey-based measures, which ask questions about social networks, trust, norms of reciprocity
etc. Second, there are measures based on observable behaviours that are expressions of these
networks and norms e.g. rates of blood donation, turnout in various elections and referenda,
TV licence payments, membership of voluntary organisations, etc.
Our first measure of social capital, which we call our standard measure, is of the second
kind, as there are simply no survey-based measures available at the municipal level for Italy,
or indeed, as far as we are aware, for any other country. It is based on electoral turnout
data and TV licence payment data, which are the only data available at the municipal level
in Italy, and are described in more detail in Section 5.1.1 below.19
Our standard measure has the drawback that it is potentially endogenous to the quality
of local institutions, as social capital indicators are the outcome of strategic interactions
between citizens and local institutions (Ashworth and de Mesquita, 2014). For example, it
18From 2015 mayors of villages with fewer than 3,000 can serve up to three consecutive terms.
19Other data such as newspaper readership and blood donations are only available at a more aggregate
(provincial) level.
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is possible that behaviours such as voter turnout, blood donation and TV licence payments
depend in part the quality of local institutions. As a result, voters in low social capital
municipalities may behave and vote differently than voters in high social capital municipal-
ities either because they have different individual characteristics (preferences, information)
or because they are responding to different institutional environments. For our purposes,
it is important to distinguish these, because in the theory, social capital is defined by the
preferences and information of individual citizens. To address this issue, we employ three
strategies to measure social capital: our standard measure and two adjusted measures based
on data from a bespoke survey (Sgroi et al. (2020)).
5.1.1 A Standard Measure of Social Capital
We construct a standard social capital index as the first principal component from the only
two social capital measures available in Italy at municipal level: (i) the share of households
paying the TV licence in each municipality in 2013 and; (ii) turnout in the 2011 Italian
referendum. Anyone owning a TV set is required by law to purchase a TV licence. The cost
of the license is set nationally, and is not trivial; in 2013 it amounted to e113.50 per year.
The enforcement of the license payment is not rigorous, and so payment is an indication of
pro-social behaviour. In 2013 sample year, about two thirds of households paid for a TV
licence, while almost every household owned a TV set.
The other measure on which our index is based is the turnout to the 2011 referendum. A
nationwide popular referendum was held in Italy on 12 June and 13 June 2011, on four ques-
tions; two concerning the repeal of recent laws regarding the privatisation of water services,
one on a return to nuclear energy which had been phased out after the 1987 referendum, and
finally one on criminal procedure, specifically a provision exempting the Prime Minister and
the Ministers from appearing in court. As referenda do not result in electing a government,
voters’ incentives to turn out are not distorted by patronage or individual benefit, and the
turnout rate can be understood as a measure of citizens’ pro-social behavior.20
5.1.2 Adjusted Measures of Social Capital
In order to construct alternative measures of social capital, which are plausibly exogenous
to the quality of local governments, we employ data collected from an original online survey
20One could argue that a possible bias in turnout could have arisen because the then prime minister, Mr
Berlusconi, declared he would not have voted and this was regarded as an implicit invitation to boycott the
referendum in order not to reach the quorum (in Italy 50 percent plus 1 of turnout is necessary to validate
the results). However turnout in 2011 was higher than it had been for any referendum since 1995. Note also
that Table 2 shows a very high correlation between 2011 and 1974 referenda turnout.
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Table 2: Measures of social capital: Correlation at regional level
2011 Ref. Blood News 1974 Ref. Tv Lic.
2011 Referendum turnout 1
Blood Donations 0.51 1
Newspaper copies 0.66 0.54 1
1974 Referendum turnout 0.78 0.74 0.75 1
TV licence 0.55 0.57 0.33 0.59 1
Notes: data aggregated at regional level. Original data available at municipal level
for 2011 referendum and TV licence, provincial level otherwise. Sources: referenda
turnout from Interior Ministry; TV Licence from RAI TV Subscription office; Blood
donation and newspaper readership from Nannicini et al. (2013).
that includes various experimental features. The survey was conducted in April 2019 in
three of Italy’s largest cities: Rome, Milan and Turin.21 In the survey, we interviewed 500
residents in each of the three cities and collected detailed information on their geographical
origin as well as the geographical origin of their parents and grandparents. More information
on the design of the survey and the results of the analysis are in Sgroi et al. (2020).
Selecting respondents sharing a common place of residence but with diverse origins al-
lows us to separate the effect of culture (as exogenous social capital) which we can derive
from their background, from the economic and institutional environment in their place of
residence. A similar “epidemiological” approach has been employed in the literature on cul-
ture and economics, and has been used to study a variety of issues, including female labour
force participation, fertility, labor market regulation, redistribution, growth, and financial
development (see Ferna´ndez and Fogli (2009) and Ferna´ndez (2007)) but as far as we are
aware, not in the context of public finance and political economy.
A key result from Sgroi et al. (2020) is that individuals’ cultural identity remains strongly
connected to the cultural traits of the place of origin of their relatives, in particular their
mother (and maternal grandmother), irrespective of their place of residence. For example,
one finding is that an individual who lives in Milan and whose mother is from Sicily con-
tributes less on average in a public good game than to another individual who lives in Milan
but whose forebears are from the north of Italy.
Using the survey results and internal migration patterns, we can isolate the cultural
component of social capital from the institutional component. More formally, we define an
21The three cities were chosen for their size and also because of their reputation for drawing internal
migrants from across Italy. Subjects were recruited through the Qualtrics Italian panel of subjects and
selected to ensure a demographic spread that eliminates bias and resembles the wider population. The
experiment was registered in advance in the AEA RCT Registry (see Bracco et al. (2019a)).
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adjusted index of social capital for province p in region r as follows:
SCp = npp,rSCp + n
p
−p,rSCr + n
p
−rSC
r
−r, where SC
r
−r =
∑
j 6=rN
r
j S˜Cj∑
j 6=rN
r
j
(18)
Here p refers either to one of the the 110 provinces or one of the 25 largest cities in Italy;
from now on, for convenience, we refer to such an entity as a province.22 Then, nppr is the
share of residents born in province p, np−p,r is the share of residents born in region r but
in provinces other than p, and np−r is the share of residents born in regions other than r.
These shares are reported in Table N.1 in the Online Appendix for each of the 110 provinces
and for the country’s 25 largest cities in 2011. Finally, N rj is the stock of migrants living in
region r who are originally from region j. Table N.2 in the Online Appendix reports these
region-by-region migration stocks N rj , collected in the same year.
As for the “SC” variables, SCp, SCr are the standard levels of social capital at the
province and region level respectively. Also, S˜Cj is a measure of social capital in region j
taken from our bespoke survey. It is the survey equivalent of the standard index; that is,
it is based on the first principal component of responses to questions on blood donation,
TV licence payments and turnout at referenda, aggregated at the level of the region of the
respondents’ mothers. Specifically, we use the survey responses to the questions ”Do you
donate blood?”,”Do you pay the TV licence?”,”Do you usually vote at referenda?” and we
average the responses by the region of respondents’ mothers. See Sgroi et al. (2020) for
details.
Given all these variable definitions, the interpretation of (18) is the following. The
adjusted indicator of social capital allocates a different level of social capital to each of three
shares of the local provincial population. Those born in the province of residence are assumed
to be the individuals with the strongest ties to the locality, and are therefore allocated the
standard level of social capital of that province. Those born in a province different from that
of residence, yet within the same region, are allocated the level of social capital of the region,
excluding the province. This construction reflects the fact that we do not have data on the
exact province of origin of inward migrants from within the region. Finally, those born in
a different region are given a level of social capital SC
r
−r, which is the weighted average of
the survey-based social capital indices across all other regions (excluding their own region
of residence), with the weights being the bilateral stock of immigrants from each of these
other regions. So, effectively, the third term assigns to the share of the province’s population
that from outside the region, the social capital of the region of origin of the mother of the
22The cities are Torino, Genova, Milano, Brescia, Verona, Venezia, Padova, Trieste, Parma, Reggio-
Emilia, Modena, Bologna, Ravenna, Firenze, Livorno, Prato, Perugia, Roma, Napoli, Bari, Taranto, Reggio
Calabria, Palermo, Messina and Catania.
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resident.
Figure 1: Social Capital, Standard and Adjusted Indexes (by Mother’s Region of Birth)
Notes: Provinces are colored according to their level of standard and adjusted social capital, ex-
pressed in term of quintiles. Darker colours indicate higher level of social capital. Special autonomy
regions (Valle d’Aosta, Trentino-Alto Adige, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Sicily and Sardinia) have been
excluded in the computation of social capital.
The map on the left of Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of the distribution of
social capital aggregated at the provincial level using the standard measure of social capital
described in Section 5.1.1; the map on the right of Figure 1 shows the distribution of social
capital for the adjusted social capital index. The two maps look similar since they differ
only in the third component, however we note a dilution of social capital in those areas with
high levels of internal immigration.
5.2 Local Government Performance
Since 2011 the Italian government has been conducting a comprehensive analysis of expen-
ditures and output of municipalities, partially calculate so-called “Standard Expenditure
Needs” (SEN) of municipalities to inform the design of the grant system to municipalities.
Information provided by official sources (balance sheets, National Institute of Statistics,
Ministry of Education, Land Registry Office, etc.) was integrated with new data from ad-
hoc questionnaires to local authorities on each service provided by municipalities, enquiring
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about outputs, inputs, methods of management and organisational decisions. From this
data, a simple system of performance indices was created, providing basic information on
how each municipality uses its resources for the provision of the essential services.
This paper uses two indexes from this exercise. First, we use an output gap indicator
scaled between 1 (worst) and 10 (best) based on the difference between the actual level
of services provided by a municipality and the standard level of services.23 Second, we
use the performance indicator, which is the difference between the output indicator and an
expenditure gap indicator. The latter is based on the difference between actual and standard
expenditures and scaled in reverse order between 1 and 10 (lower score for higher levels of
expenditure gap). By construction, the performance index is higher for a municipality that
can provide a given level of output at lower expenditure i.e. that is more efficient (see
Porcelli et al., 2016, for details).
The first set of Opencivitas performance indices use 2010 data collected by the Ministry of
Finance in 2011 and 2012. There have been subsequently three further waves using data from
2013, 2015 and 2016 (collected by the Italian Ministry of Finance respectively in 2016, 2017
and 2018). The computation of each wave of this index has been done to allow cross-wave
comparisons.24 Since 2015, these data have been published online on the website Opencivitas
(www.opencivitas.it).
To illustrate, we show in Figure 2 the average province-level values of the output and
efficiency indices obtained for 2016. From these we can observe an obvious North-South
gradient, but there is also variability within broad regions.
6 Empirical Results
6.1 Data Description and Variable Definitions
Three main testable predictions emerge from the theory. The first is that municipal perfor-
mance and output depend on two key factors, the degree of social capital and the presence of
23The standard level of services corresponds to the simple average of the level of services provided by
municipalities in the same population bracket (local authorities have been divided into ten population brack-
ets from those below 500 inhabitants to those above 100,000 inhabitants). The historical level of services
is a composite indicator of the outputs produced in the essential municipal functions: number of users of
the social care service, number of users of the ancillary education services, number of fines and controls
carried out by local police officers, tons of urban waste recycled, number of authorisations and inspections
for planning activities in the environmental and land management sector. Weights correspond to the level
of expenditure employed in each service.
24We use the 2010 index for years between 2008 and 2011; the average between the 2010 and 2013 index
for year 2012; the 2013 index for year 2013; the average between 2013 and 2015 index for year 2014; the
2015 index for year 2015; the 2016 index for all subsequent years.
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Figure 2: Municipal Output and Performance index: Quintiles of Averages at the Province
Level
Notes: Provinces are colored according to their level of the output and performance indices, ex-
pressed in term of quintiles. Darker colours indicate a higher level of the index. Data for Special
autonomy regions (Valle d’Aosta, Trentino-Alto Adige, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Sicily and Sardinia)
are not available since standard expenditure needs are computed only for municipalities in normal
regions.
electoral incentives, i.e. the possibility for the incumbent mayor to run in the next election
(Proposition 4). The second one is that the probability of incumbent re-election is nega-
tively affected by the level of social capital in that municipality (Proposition 2). The last
one is that the incumbent’s vote share is decreasing in social capital, but that the effect of
her performance on vote share is increasing in social capital i.e. the interaction is positive
(Proposition 3).
We test these predictions using a panel for over 6700 municipalities (85% of Italian munic-
ipalities, since municipalities in special-autonomy regions have been excluded) for the period
2008–2016, the period for which the performance and output indices are available. We mea-
sure our first outcome variables, municipal performance and output, using the Opencivitas
performance and output indexes described in the previous Section.25 We measure our second
outcome variable, the probability of incumbent re-election, as a dummy variable that takes
25Note that the social capital indexes are not time-varying, but the performance and output indexes are
time-varying and intermediate years are interpolated.
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value one if the incumbent mayor is re-elected, and zero otherwise. We measure the third
outcome variable as the ratio of votes for the incumbent over the total number of votes.
Our key explanatory variable for all three testable predictions is a measure of the level
of social capital, SC, in that municipality. In our baseline regressions we will employ the
standard social capital index discussed in Section 5.1.1; due to endogeneity concerns, we will
also instrument it with the adjusted social capital index developed in Section 5.1.2. Note
that to ease the interpretation and the comparison of the results all social capital indices
have been standardised to have mean zero and standard deviation of one.
To control for the main characteristics of comuni we also use municipal financial, census,
and election data. In particular, we have the following municipal controls : per capita prop-
erty tax burden, per capita grants from upper-tier governments, average per capita taxable
income, population, proportion of children (less than 14 years old) and elderly (over 65 years
old), and regional indicator variables. These variables are collected from the Statistical Atlas
of Municipalities, yearly issued by the Italian National Statistical Institute (ISTAT) and the
Ministry of Economy and Finance (MoF) and all monetary values are deflated using ISTAT
2001 monetary revaluation index.
We also employ political controls. First, to take into account a mayor’s political prefer-
ences, we construct three indicator variables, Left,Right, Independent dummies, each taking
the value of one if the mayor is supported by a left-wing coalition, right-wing coalition or
she is an independent respectively, and zero otherwise. As performance may be affected by
the electoral cycle, we include a control variable, electoral cycle, calculated as the number
of years since the previous election. We also include a term limit dummy, TL, which takes
a value of one when the mayor cannot run for re-election because of the term limit, which
is two terms for municipalities with more than 3,000 inhabitants and three for municipali-
ties with less than 3,000 inhabitants. We also account for the fact that electoral rules are
simpler for small municipalities (first past the post for municipality with less than 15,000
inhabitants) by using a dummy SmallMunicipality for these cases. In selected specifications
we also include the Lagged Margin of Victory variable which is the difference in vote share
between the winner and the runner-up in the previous elections.
Our last set of controls are related to mayor characteristics : age (linear and quadratic),
gender, education, and the mayor’s previous occupations, via four dummy variables: low
skilled and not relevant to the current position, low skilled and relevant, high skilled and
not relevant and high skilled and relevant.26 These should help to control for the selection
26To give an example, a mayor previously working as lawyer or pubic manager would be classified as high
skilled/high relevant, on the contrary an unskilled manual worker would be classified as high skilled/low
relevant.
24
effect. In Table 4 we report the summary statistics for all our variables.
6.2 Social Capital and Municipal Performance
We start by testing the predictions in Proposition 4. These are first, that that municipal
performance in the first term of office unambiguously increases with social capital, and
second that the interaction between social capital and the term limit is positive or negative
depending on whether the selection or discipline effect of elections dominates. We estimate
the following equation:
Perf it = αSCi + βTLit + γ(SCi × TLit) + δ′Xit + φ′Zit + uit (19)
The dependent variable is municipal performance (Perf ), measured by the Opencivitas per-
formance (1-10) score, and the regressors of interest are the social capital indicators (SC)
and the term-limit dummy (TL).
The main coefficients of interest are α and γ; the theory predicts that α > 0. Also,
as already noted, a positive γ would indicate that the positive effect of social capital on
selection is stronger than the effect on discipline and vice versa.
Throughout, we also use a common set of municipal controls Xit, as described in 6.1.
Moreover, Zit are a set of additional regressors relating to the political characteristics of the
municipality and the personal characteristics if the mayor. Finally we also allow for regional
and year fixed effects and their interaction throughout. We include the interactions between
years and regional dummies to control for the effect on performance of those unobservable
factors affecting regions differentially in a given year, such as bilateral immigration flows.
Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level.
The results are reported in Table 5. In the first column we regress the Opencivitas index
of municipal performance on the standard social capital index and the municipal controls.
The second and third columns add the TL dummy and its interaction with Perf without
and with the interaction with the municipal controls (X). In the fourth column we augment
the specification of column 3 with the full set of controls (the vectors X and Z) and their
interaction with the TL dummy.
However as discussed in Section 5.1, traditional measures of social capital may be en-
dogenous because they are the outcomes of the interactions between individuals and local
institutions. To address this concern, we instrument the standard social capital index in two
ways. First, in column 5, we instrument the standard social capital index and its interaction
with TL by the adjusted social capital index introduced in Section 5.1.2 and its interaction
with TL respectively.
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Second, as discussed in section 5.1, S˜Cj is constructed from answers of respondents to
questions about the payment of the TV license and voting in referenda and these may be
subject to measurement error because of e.g. unwillingness to admit to anti-social behaviour,
etc. To address this concern, we replace S˜Cj with SCj in SC
r
−r. This addresses the measure-
ment problem in that SCj are calculated from administrative data on the payment of TV
licenses and referendum turnout. We will call this measure the population adjusted index.
Then, in column 6, we instrument the standard social capital index and its interaction with
TL by the population adjusted index and its interaction.
From the inspection of Table 5 we can clearly see that the effect of social capital on per-
formance is always positive and strongly significant in all our specifications. The estimated
coefficients α in columns 1 to 3 are in the range of 0.19-0.22, both without and with controls.
From these estimates, we can compute that a one standard deviation increase in social cap-
ital increases the performance of non-term-limited mayors on average by about 4 percent;
also, moving from the lowest to the median level of social capital increases performance by
about 20 percent.
The interaction between the TL and SC is negative but not significant in column 2 and
becomes significant and negative from column 3 onward. This suggests that the discipline
effect of elections prevails over the selection effect. In particular, if the mayor is term limited,
the positive effect of a one standard deviation increase in social capital on performance is
reduced by about 1.6 percent. Similarly, moving from the municipality with the lowest social
capital to the one with the the median level reduces the positive effect of social capital on
performance on term-limited mayors by about 8 percent.
The results when SC and its interaction with TL are instrumented are reported in
columns 5 and 6. The F test statistics for the first stage regressions are very large, as
expected. We also report the Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test; under the null hypoth-
esis that the endogenous regressors can actually be treated as exogenous, the test statistic is
distributed as chi-squared. We can clearly reject the hypothesis that the standard measure
of SC is exogenous.
In columns 5 and 6, coefficients on SC and SC × TL are approximately three times
larger than in the OLS specification. The results suggest that an increase in one standard
deviation in the the social capital indicator increases municipal performance of 8.3 percent
if the local government is term-limited and of 14 percent if the mayor can run again.
Turning to the effect of the other controls, the fact that a municipality has high income
per capita and receives a high intergovernmental grant is associated with low performance, a
possible reason being that the availability of financial resources creates a perverse disincen-
tive to spend resources efficiently. This result also indicates that social capital is capturing
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something else beyond availability of resources. As for the political variables, column 4
indicates that municipalities ruled by traditional coalitions, rather than civic lists, are as-
sociated with higher performance. Small Municipality, the dummy for the municipalities
with population less that 3000, which have a three-term limit, is positive but only significant
in the the last two columns. The First past the post dummy, identifying the change in
electoral system at the 15,000 inhabitant threshold, is consistently negative and significant.
Regarding mayors’ characteristics, we control for education, i.e. whether or not they have an
university degree, gender, age (linear and quadratic), and the mayor’s previous occupation.
The only personal characteristic which seems to play a significant role in affecting perfor-
mance is gender. Female mayors are associated with higher performance; a female mayor’ s
performance is about 2 percent higher than that of a male counterpart.
As a further exercise, we re-estimate model (19) replacing the Opencivitas performance
index with the output index. The results for this exercise are in Table 7; the format of the
table is the same as in Table 5. We see that as in the case of performance, the level of social
capital has a positive effect on output, significant at the 1% level. The first four columns of
Table 7 have a coefficient on SC of about 0.28, both with and without controls. However
when SC is instrumented, the size of this coefficient increases by a factor of five and is still
significant at 1%. In contrast to the case of performance, the interaction between the social
capital indicator and the non-term-limit dummy is now never significant.
Finally, as a robustness check we re-estimate model (19) using two different sub-samples.
Results for this exercise are reported in Table N.3 in the Appendix. First, given that the
survey employed to construct the adjusted social capital was conducted in Milan, Rome and
Turin, we exclude data from these three municipalities to estimate model (19), columns 1-3.
Second, since data on internal migration are based on 2011 Census, exclude data from earlier
years, columns 4-6. The set of controls is the same as in the previous regressions. Overall
the results confirm the findings reported in Table 5.
6.3 Social Capital and the Incumbent Re-Election Probability
Proposition 2 above predicts that, unconditional on performance, high social capital is asso-
ciated with a lower re-election probability because of the lame duck effect i.e. social capital
has a positive effect on discipline, making it more attractive for voters to replace the term-
limited incumbent with a disciplined challenger. We can easily test this, as all municipalities
had at least one election during our sample period. Information on the distribution of elec-
tions across geographical areas and by social capital for any given year is provided in Table
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Table 3: Distribution of Elections by year, Social Capital and Geographical Location.
Year N.Elections Share High SC North Centre South
2007 756 0.43 0.41 0.13 0.47
2008 393 0.46 0.36 0.16 0.48
2009 3999 0.49 0.69 0.15 0.16
2010 437 0.54 0.34 0.08 0.57
2011 1152 0.54 0.47 0.15 0.38
2012 708 0.45 0.43 0.14 0.43
2013 520 0.50 0.43 0.14 0.43
2014 3819 0.49 0.69 0.15 0.16
2015 508 0.41 0.34 0.10 0.55
2016 1,162 0.45 0.48 0.15 0.36
Note:a municipality is defined as HSC if its level of standard social capital is above
the median level.
3. This Table shows that the share of high social capital municipalities holding elections
does not differ much by year.
We estimate the following equation:
REi,e = αSCi + β
′Xi,e + δ′Zi,e + ui,e (20)
where e is an election year (specific to each municipality), and REi,e is a dummy taking
value of one if the incumbent is re-elected in that year in municipality i and zero otherwise.
The key coefficient in (20) is α: from Proposition 2, we expect this to be negative.
We propose two alternatives for this exercise. In the first one, RE is defined at the
candidate level; RE = 1 if the incumbent mayor is re-elected at the next election and zero
otherwise. We consider both the set of elections where the incumbent could run in the
following period i.e. she was not term limited and less than 70 years old (columns 1 to 4 of
Table 7) and the set of elections where the incumbent actually did run, column 5.
The second alternative, reported in column 6 of Table 7, is where RE is defined at the
party level i.e. where RE = 1 if a candidate from the incumbent party coalition is re-elected
and zero otherwise. In this case, we use the full set of elections. This specification takes
into account a typical feature of the Italian municipal system, where it is often the deputy
mayor, or a member of the local government from the same party, that runs for the post if
the mayor is term limited. We estimate a linear probability model, and standard errors are
clustered at provincial level.27
As controls we employ the basic set of municipal controls (X) and also the the set of
political controls and mayoral characteristics (Z). In addition, to take into account the
27Probit regressions produce very similar results and are available upon request.
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extent of electoral competition in each municipality, we also include the incumbent margin
of victory (i.e. the difference in the vote share between the winner and the runner up) at
the previous election. Regional and year fixed effects are included in all regressions.
The results are given in Table 7 below. Specifications 1 and 2 are estimated using the
standard measure of social capital, and in specifications 3 to 6, SC is instrumented by the
adjusted social capital index as in Tables 5 and 7. The results show a negative effect of social
capital on the incumbent re-election probability that is robust across all specifications. The
magnitude of the estimated α is in the order of -0.02 when estimated without controls, to
-0.046 when instrumented if we use the full set of incumbents who can run in the next
election. In the specification of column 4, a one standard deviation increase in social capital
is associated with a 6.9 percent decrease in the probability of incumbent re-election. Moving
from the lowest level of social capital to the median level decreases the probability of being
re-elected for the incumbent mayor by fully 33 percent. Overall, these results are as predicted
by the the theory.
Regarding the other controls, we observe the following. The first past the post system, in
place for municipalities with population under 15,000 residents, is associated with a decrease
in the likelihood to of re-election. The party of the incumbent does seem to play a role in
affecting re-election; there is a positive effect of traditional left or right coalitions compared
to civic list or populist parties. The previous occupation of the mayor does (marginally)
matter for high skilled and experienced mayors but age does not. Being a female incumbent
is negatively associated with re-election, despite the fact that, according to Table 5, women
perform generally better than men. In column 5 we restrict the sample to those elections
where the mayor runs again. We see similar results as in the previous columns, but the
coefficients are about three times larger. In column 6 we use the party-based definition of
incumbent with very similar results; here an increase of one standard deviation of social
capital is associated with a reduction of 6.6 percent in the probability of re-election.
6.4 Social Capital, Performance, and the Incumbent Vote Share
We now turn to test the empirical prediction in Proposition 3, which is that incumbent vote
share is negatively associated with the level of social capital, but that the positive effect
of performance on the vote share is increasing in social capital i.e. the interaction effect is
positive. We estimate the following equation:
V oteSharei,e = αSCi + β(SCi ×∆Perfi,e) + γ∆Perfi,e + δ′Xi,e + φ′Zi,e + ui,e (21)
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The main coefficients of interest are α and β; the theory predicts that α will be negative,
and the interaction coefficient β will be positive.
Here, as before, e is an election year, specific to each municipality. The analysis is
restricted to the set of elections where the incumbent mayor re-runs for election. V oteShare
is the log of the number of votes cast for the incumbent as a share of the total number
of votes cast. The social capital index SC is treated in two ways. First we employ the
standard index, both on its own and interacted with our measure of performance. Second,
we explore an alternative approach by constructing a dummy, HSC, taking the value of one
if a municipality is in the top half of the social capital distribution and zero in the bottom
half, measuring social capital by the standard social capital index. This second approach
provides a robustness check and also facilitates the interpretation of the results.
We find that voters are more responsive to changes in performance the around the time
of the election than the level. So, we enter performance in difference form, ∆Perf , defined
as the log of the difference between the municipal performance index in the year before
an election compared to the year before that. We also control for our set of municipality
characteristics X, and for incumbent characteristics and municipal political variables, Z, as
in previous regressions. All regressions include also regional dummies and election years.
Standard errors are clustered by region.
Table 8 reports the output for the estimation of equation (21). Columns 1 and 4 present
the results for the basic specifications for the two social capital measures, without additional
controls. The estimated level effect of social capital on incumbent vote share is negative and
highly significant in both columns; this is consistent with the theory and in line with the
results in Section 6.3, i.e. that in municipalities with high social capital, the probability of
incumbent re-election is negatively related to social capital. The interaction term between
social capital and ∆Perf is positive and highly significant, again as predicted.
Columns 2 and 4 augment the baseline specification with a full set of municipal and
mayor controls; both the level and the interaction effects remain very significant and with
the expected signs but the level effect is are reduced by approximately one half. Note also
that the effect of ∆Perf on the incumbent vote share is not significantly different from zero
in most of the specifications. So low social capital municipalities appear to be not very
responsive to performance.
To give an idea of the magnitude of the impact of social capital on the incumbent vote
share, we use the results displayed in column 2; an increase of one standard deviation in the
social capital index is associated with 1.1 percent decrease in incumbent vote share. Similarly
column 5 indicates that being in a high social capital municipality lowers the incumbent vote
share by about 2.4 percent. To give an idea of the magnitude of the effect of performance
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change on the popularity of the incumbent, from column 5, a doubling in rate of change in
performance in the year prior to an election is associated with about 2.4 percent increase
in the incumbent’s vote share in high social capital municipalities. There is no significant
response to performance in low social capital municipalities.
In columns 3 and 6 we instrument the SC and the interaction between SC and ∆Perf
with the corresponding adjusted social capital index or high social capital dummy based on
the adjusted index. Specifically, in column 3, the instruments are the adjusted social capital
index and its interaction with ∆Perf . In column 6, the instruments are the adjusted high
social capital dummy defined using the adjusted social capital index and its interaction with
∆Perf . In these cases, the magnitude of the interaction effect increases and it remains highly
significant, but the level effect of social capital loses significance. However, the Hausman
test reported at the bottom of the table indicates that the OLS is the best specification for
both cases.
Turning to the effect of the additional controls on incumbent vote share, most of the
controls are not consistently significant in all the specifications. The negative effect of co-
efficient of a female incumbent is again observed, as in the estimates of the unconditional
re-election probability.
7 Conclusion
This paper has made three contributions. First, we have presented a theoretical analysis of
how both the civic preference and information aspects of social capital impact on government
performance and turnover, employing a political agency model with both moral hazard
and adverse selection. Second, we have presented novel measures of both local government
performance and on social capital at the Italian municipality level, using administrative
data and an online survey respectively. Third, our empirical results have shown that higher
social capital improves government performance, especially in the first term of office, but
also increases turnover of incumbent mayors, as predicted by the theory. The voting rule
predicted by the theory has the feature that the level effect of social capital on the incumbent
vote share is negative, but the interaction between social capital and performance is positive,
and we have found empirical support for this. Our paper is one of the first, we believe, to
show a link between social capital and the technical efficiency of government. It is also the
first to show that unconditionally, social capital is linked to higher turnover.
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Table 4: SUMMARY STATISTICS
Variables Mean Std. Dev. N
Opencivitas Performance Index 5.893 1.886 49618
Opencivitas Output Index 5.485 2.759 49618
Municipal Characteristics
Population 7.724 45.438 49618
Share children 0.129 0.027 49618
Share elderly 0.224 0.058 49618
Income (thousand of Euros pc, deflated) 14.110 3.018 49618
Grants, per capita (deflated) 160.668 237.966 49618
Property tax, per capita (deflated) 132.985 156.3741 49618
Municipal Political Variables
Relection (person) (dummy) 0.539 0.498 34181
Relection (party) (dummy) 0.688 0.462 29690
Term limit (dummy) 0.376 0.484 49142
Small Municipality (population < 3k, dummy) 0.550 0.497 49618
Municipal Majority Coalition: Left-wing (dummy) 0.097 0.297 49142
Municipal Majority Coalition: Right-wing (dummy) 0.092 0.289 49142
Margin of Victory (MV) 21.637 18.522 43497
First past the post (population < 15k inhabs, dummy) 0.096 0.294 49618
Electoral Cycle 1.943 1.331 49142
Mayor Characteristics
Incumbent: Female (dummy) 0.117 0.321 49618
Incumbent: Age 50.256 10.364 49142
Incumbent: College degree (dummy) 0.453 0.497 44587
Incumbent: High school Graduate (dummy) 0.449 0.497 42647
Job Skill/relevance: low:low (dummy) 0.194 0.396 42119
Job Skill/relevance: low:high (dummy) 0.037 0.188 42119
Job Skill/relevance: high:low (dummy) 0.317 0.465 42119
Job Skill/relevance: high:high (dummy) 0.341 0.474 42119
Notes: Performance index and output index are collected from the website Opencivitas.it;
Social capital measures are collected from multiple sources (Ministry of Interior, the Italian
national public broadcasting, and authors’ survey); Municipal Characteristics are provided by
the Italian National Institute of Statistics and the Ministry of Economy and Finance; Municipal
Political variables and Mayors Characteristics are collected from the official electoral archives
of the Ministry of the Interior. The margin of Victory is computed considering the last round
of the election. The electoral cycle counts the number of years from the ballot. High job
skill identifies mayors whose occupation requires a university degree; instead, high relevance
identifies mayors whose profession is related to public administration independently on the
specialization. Deflated refers to base year 2001.
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Table 5: MUNICIPAL PERFORMANCE EQUATION
Dep. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Municipal Performance
SC 0.1986*** 0.2068*** 0.2206*** 0.2212*** 0.8355*** 0.8065***
[0.021] [0.022] [0.023] [0.025] [0.069] [0.067]
SC X Term Limit -0.0229 -0.0898*** -0.0950*** -0.3480** -0.3210**
[0.026] [0.032] [0.034] [0.146] [0.139]
Term Limit 0.0023 -0.0143 0.0185 0.0781*
0.0802*
[0.024] [0.060] [0.063] [0.045] [0.044]
Income -0.0699*** -0.0700*** -0.0775*** -0.0740*** -0.1177*** -0.1158***
[0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.011] [0.007] [0.007]
Grants -0.0009*** -0.0008*** -0.0008*** -0.0007*** -0.0006*** -0.0006***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Majority Coalition Left 0.1564** 0.0142 0.0177
[0.077] [0.037] [0.036]
Majority Coalition Right 0.0329 0.1264*** 0.1243***
[0.061] [0.030] [0.030]
Small 0.0103 0.1213*** 0.1332***
[0.047] [0.029] [0.029]
First past the post -0.2329*** -0.1018*** -0.1041***
[0.078] [0.036] [0.036]
Incumbent Female 0.1214*** 0.0983*** 0.0989***
[0.046] [0.027] [0.027]
Incumbent Age 0.0134 0.0108 0.0110
[0.014] [0.008] [0.008]
Incumbent Degree 0.0575 0.0230 0.0242
[0.060] [0.035] [0.035]
Incumbent Highly Experienced and Skilled 0.0083 -0.0009 -0.0013
[0.046] [0.026] [0.026]
X Controls NO NO NO YES YES YES
Z x Term Limit NO NO YES YES YES YES
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV
Instruments Adj. Pop. Adj.
First Stage F-statistics for SC 981.93 1009.84
p-values [0.00] [0.00]
First Stage F-statistics for SC X Term Limit 285.27 294.03
p-values [0.00] [0.00]
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 138.80 132.03
p-values [0.00] [0.00]
Observations 49,618 49,142 49,141 43,880 37,846 37,846
R-squared 0.213 0.212 0.215 0.217 0.189 0.193
Notes: standard errors clustered at municipal level in brackets, * = p < 0.1, **= p < 0.05, *** = p < 0.01. Dependent
variable is the Opencivitas Performance Indicators. Regional dummies, year dummies and municipal controls (X) are
included in all regressions. X includes per capita municipal income, per capita municipal grants from upper levels of
governments, population, share of population above 65 years old and below 15 years old. Social capital is the standardized
standard social capital index, in columns 5 and 6 social capital is instrumented with the adjusted and population adjusted
social capital index. Z controls include: plurality rule elections for municipalities with less than 15,000 inhabitants, no
term limit dummy for municipalities with less than 3,000 inhabitants, majority coalition Right (Left) coalition dummies,
mayor’s age and aged squared, gender, education (university or high school degree), occupation prior to mandate (high
skill/low skill and experience relevant/non relevant to mandate).
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Table 6: MUNICIPAL OUTPUT EQUATION
Dep. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Municipal Output
SC 0.2751*** 0.2897*** 0.2924*** 0.2880*** 1.5352*** 1.5138***
[0.028] [0.030] [0.032] [0.034] [0.1030] [0.1003]
SC X Term Limit -0.0422 -0.0246 -0.0128 -0.2959 -0.2689
[0.036] [0.043] [0.046] [0.217] [0.208]
Term Limit 0.0403 -0.0404 -0.0409 0.0252 0.0275
[0.036] [0.088] [0.093] [0.068] [0.068]
Income 0.0894*** 0.0896*** 0.0831*** 0.0899*** -0.0145 -0.0133
[0.013] [0.013] [0.014] [0.015] [0.011] [0.011]
Grants 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0009*** 0.0009***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Majority Coalition Left 0.4002*** 0.1837*** 0.1856***
[0.107] [0.055] [0.055]
Majority Coalition Right 0.1151 0.3469*** 0.3456***
[0.088] [0.047] [0.047]
Small 0.0768 0.4535*** 0.4685***
[0.067] [0.044] [0.043]
First past the post -0.3440*** -0.1859*** -0.1871***
[0.108] [0.054] [0.054]
Incumbent Female 0.1521** 0.1127*** 0.1129***
[0.066] [0.042] [0.042]
Incumbent Age -0.0048 -0.0170 -0.0169
[0.019] [0.012] [0.012]
Incumbent Degree 0.0424 0.0340 0.0347
[0.085] [0.054] [0.054]
Incumbent Highly Experienced and Skilled 0.0122 0.0210 0.0209
[0.064] [0.040] [0.040]
X Controls NO NO NO YES YES YES
Z x Term Limit NO NO YES YES YES YES
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV
Instruments Adj. Pop. Adj.
First Stage F-statistics for SC 981.33 1009.84
p-values [0.00] [0.00]
First Stage F-statistics SC X Term Limit 285.27 294.06
p-values [0.00] [0.00]
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 314.25 317.471
p values [0.00] [0.00]
Observations 49,618 49,142 49,141 43,880 37,846 37,846
R-squared 0.213 0.213 0.215 0.210 0.106 0.109
Notes: standard errors clustered at municipal level in brackets, * = p < 0.1, **= p < 0.05, *** = p < 0.01. Dependent
variable is the Opencivitas Output Indicator. Regional dummies, year dummies and municipal controls (Z) are included
in all regressions. X includes per capita municipal income, per capita municipal grants from upper levels of governments,
population, share of population above 65 years old and below 15 years old. Social capital is the standardized standard
social capital index, in columns 5 and 6 social capital is instrumented with the adjusted and population adjusted social
capital index. Z controls include: plurality rule elections for municipalities with less than 15,000 inhabitants, no term limit
dummy for municipalities with less than 3,000 inhabitants, majority coalition Right (Left) coalition dummies, mayor’s age
and aged squared, gender, education (university or high school degree), occupation prior to mandate (high skill/low skill
and experience relevant/non relevant to mandate).
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Table 7: INCUMBENT RE-ELECTION EQUATION
Dep. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Incumbent Reelection Inc. Person Inc. Person Inc. Person Inc. Person In. Person Inc. Party
SC -0.0199*** -0.0136** -0.0464** -0.0458** -0.1473*** -0.0626**
[0.006] [0.006] [0.019] [0.019] [0.054] [0.025]
Municipal Income -0.0074*** -0.0020 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0058 0.0134*
[0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.011] [0.007]
Municipal Grants 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 0.0001 0.0000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
First past the post -0.0475*** -0.0553*** -0.0552*** -0.1411*** -0.2190***
[0.013] [0.015] [0.015] [0.045] [0.025]
Small Municipality 0.1427*** 0.1362*** 0.1363*** 0.3848*** 0.0710***
[0.010] [0.013] [0.013] [0.030] [0.024]
Majority Coalition Right 0.1015*** 0.0961*** 0.0961*** 0.0592 0.1258***
[0.017] [0.019] [0.019] [0.054] [0.038]
Majority Coalition Left 0.0606*** 0.0676*** 0.0674*** 0.1739*** 0.2621***
[0.013] [0.016] [0.016] [0.055] [0.028]
Incumbent Female -0.0386*** -0.0400*** -0.0401*** -0.1321*** -0.0386*
[0.012] [0.013] [0.013] [0.047] [0.021]
Incumbent Age 0.0071 0.0043 0.0043 0.0102 0.0151**
[0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.011] [0.007]
Incumbent University Degree -0.0121 -0.0118 -0.0119 -0.0466 -0.0424***
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.032] [0.016]
Incumbent Highly Experienced and Low Skilled -0.0666*** -0.0640** -0.0640** -0.0047 -0.0029
[0.024] [0.026] [0.026] [0.054] [0.041]
Incumbent Low Experienced and Highly Skilled 0.0149 0.0154 0.0154 0.0048 -0.0130
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.041] [0.017]
Incumbent Highly Experienced and Skilled 0.0248** 0.0218* 0.0219* -0.0012 -0.0208
[0.011] [0.012] [0.012] [0.039] [0.019]
X Controls No YES YES YES YES YES
Sample Inc. can run Inc. can run Inc. can run Inc. can run Inc. does run All elections
Method LPM LPM IV IV IV IV
Instruments Pop. Adj. Adj. Pop. Adj. Adj.
First Stage F Statistics 55.25 128.55 17.85 34.41
p values [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 2.786 2.544 16.51 5.57
p values [0.09] [0.11] [0.19] [0.01]
Observations 5,118 4,768 4,059 4,059 1,912 7,966
R-squared 0.016 0.381 0.380 0.380 0.460 0.109
Notes: standard errors clustered at provincial level in brackets, * = p < 0.1, **= p < 0.05, *** = p < 0.01. Dependent variable is a dummy
equal to one if the incumbent is re-elected and zero otherwise. Regional dummies, year dummies and municipal controls (X) are included in
all regressions. X includes per capita municipal income, per capita municipal grants from upper levels of governments, population, share of
population above 65 years old and below 15 years old. Social capital is the (standardized) standard social capital index, in columns (3) to
(6) social capital is instrumented with the adjusted/population adjusted social capital indexes. Z controls include: plurality rule elections
for municipalities with less than 15,000 inhabitants, no term limit dummy for municipalities with less than 3,000 inhabitants, majority
coalition Right (Left) coalition dummies, mayor’s age and aged squared, gender, education (university or high school degree), occupation
prior to mandate (high skill/low skill and experience relevant/non relevant to mandate).
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Table 8: THE EFFECT OF SOCIAL CAPITAL ON INCUMBENT VOTE SHARE
Dep Var (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Incumbent vote share Social Capital Index High Social Capital Dummy
SC -0.0247*** -0.0111*** -0.0112
[0.002] [0.002] [0.023]
SC ×∆Perf. 0.0042*** 0.0066*** 0.0191***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.006]
HSC -0.0587*** -0.0246*** -0.1916
[0.014] [0.009] [0.142]
HSC ×∆Perf. 0.0166** 0.0236*** 0.0791***
[0.008] [0.007] [0.014]
∆Perf. -0.0063 -0.0037 -0.0026 -0.0135 -0.0154 -0.0475***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.014] [0.012] [0.014]
Municipal Grants 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000* 0.0000**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Property Tax -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Incumbent Coalition Left 0.0569*** -0.0599*** 0.0586 0.0726***
[0.016] [0.018] [0.051] [0.024]
Incumbent Coalition Right 0.0333*** -0.0874*** 0.0349 0.0419***
[0.010] [0.019] [0.039] [0.009]
Incumbent Female -0.0513*** -0.0212*** -0.0499** -0.0412***
[0.007] [0.005] [0.020] [0.001]
Incumbent Age -0.0008 -0.0015 -0.0007 -0.0005
[0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.002]
Incumbent Degree -0.0242*** -0.0254* -0.0247 -0.0214***
[0.004] [0.014] [0.026] [0.008]
Incumbent High Experienced and Low Skilled -0.0217 -0.0187 -0.0201 -0.0191
[0.031] [0.026] [0.033] [0.037]
Incumbent Low Experienced and Highly Skilled -0.0036 -0.0037 -0.0020 0.0004
[0.008] [0.004] [0.014] [0.009]
Incumbent Highly Experienced and Skilled -0.0127** -0.0081 -0.0108 0.0021
[0.006] [0.006] [0.010] [0.013]
X Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Z Controls NO YES YES NO YES YES
Method OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV
Instrument Adj. Adj.
First stage for HSC/SC 47.91 12.16
p values [0.00] [0.00]
First stage for HSC/SC ×∆Perf. 66.78 80.26
p values [0.00] [0.00]
Durbin Wu Hausman test 0.97 3.81
p values [0.613] [0.149]
Observations 2,242 2,100 1,788 2,485 2,100 1,788
R-squared 0.086 0.020 0.053 0.088 0.022 0.102
Notes: standard errors clustered at regional level in brackets, * = p < 0.1, **= p < 0.05, *** = p < 0.01. Dependent
variable is the (log of) share of incumbent votes over total votes. Regional dummies, year dummies and municipal controls
(X) are included in all regressions. X includes per capita municipal income, per capita municipal grants from upper levels of
governments, population, share of population above 65 years old and below 15 years old. Z controls include: plurality rule
elections for municipalities with less than 15,000 inhabitants, no term limit dummy for municipalities with less than 3,000
inhabitants, majority coalition Right (Left) coalition dummies, mayor’s age and aged squared, gender, education (university or
high school degree), occupation prior to mandate (high skill/low skill and experience relevant/non relevant to mandate). Social
capital is the (standardized) standard social capital index, in columns (3) and (6) social capital is instrumented with the adjusted
SC index.
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Appendix
A. Proofs of Propositions and Further Results
Analysis of Voter Behaviour and Derivation of equations (7),(12),(13). Assume first that
the voter does not observe effort. Then, at the end of the first period of office, even though she
observes Tt = T
∗, the voter has no new information about the type of the incumbent, so she expects
him to make an effort e∗ with probability pi. So, the continuation value of re-electing the incumbent
is just
V inc = u0 + pi∆u, (A.1)
where u0,∆u are defined in (A.2 ) above. So, from (3), (A.1), the uninformed voter will vote for
the incumbent if and only if
u0 + pi∆u− V + vi + ω ≥ 0. (A.2)
By a similar argument, the continuation value of re-electing the incumbent for an informed voter
is:
V inc(e) = u0 + Pr(i = g |e)∆u (A.3)
where e is the level of effort set by the incumbent, and Pr(i = g |e) is the posterior probability that
the incumbent is good, conditional on e. So, comparing (6), (A.3), the key difference is that when
the voter is informed, this continuation value V inc(e) possibly depends on e, because e can convey
information to the voter about the type of the incumbent. So, the informed voter will vote for the
incumbent iff
u0 + Pr(i = g |e)∆u− V + vi + w ≥ 0, (A.4)
Now, let ∆ be the expected difference in policy payoffs from retaining the incumbent versus
not retaining him for both types of voter i.e ∆ = u0 + pi∆u− V, u0 + Pr(i = g )∆u− V. As there
are a continuum of voters, and vi is uniform on
[−12 , 12] , then conditional on ω + ∆, the fraction
of voters who vote for the incumbent is given by
Pr (vi ≥ −(ω + ∆)) = 1
2
+ (ω + ∆) (A.5)
So, the share of the vote conditional on ω,∆ is
x(ω) = σ
(
1
2
+ (ω + ∆(e))
)
+ (1− σ)
(
1
2
+ (ω + ∆)
)
(A.6)
So, taking the expectation of x(ω) across ω, using Eω = 0, the share of the vote for the incumbent
is
x =
1
2
+ ∆, ∆ = σ∆(e) + (1− σ)∆
= (u0 + pi∆u− V ) + σ∆u(Pr(i = g |e)− pi)
where in the second line, we use (A.2), (A.4). This gives (13) as required.
To derive (7), note that conditional on ω, the incumbent will win if he sets et = e
∗ iff the overall
share of the vote exceeds 50%. Using (13), this requires
σ
(
1
2
+
ω + ∆(e)
)
+ (1− σ)
(
1
2
+
ω + ∆
)
≥ 1
2
⇒ ω ≥ −∆
A.1
So, given that ω is uniform on
[
− 12γ , 12γ
]
, the probability that the incumbent wins in this event is
p(e) ≡ Pr (ω ≥ −∆) = 1
2
+ γ (σ∆(e) + (1− σ)∆) (A.7)
Then, substituting (A.2), (A.4) in (A.7) gives us (7) as required.
Proof of Proposition 1. The bad incumbent gets the following payoffs from pooling and sepa-
rating respectively:
− c(e∗) + p(e∗)δR, 0 + p(0)δR (A.8)
where p(e∗), p(0) are defined in (7) above. So, he will pool if and only if the first term in (A.8) is
larger than the second. This requires, using (7), that the incumbent is willing to pool if
γσ∆u(Pr(i = g |e∗ )− Pr(i = g |0)) ≥ c(e
∗)
δR
≡ A (A.9)
Here, the left-hand side is the increase in the re-election probability from making high effort. In
particular, if (A.9) holds with equality, the bad incumbent will be willing to randomize.
Now, as the good type always chooses e∗, a choice of e = 0 reveals the incumbent to be bad,
and so Pr(i = g |0) = 0. Moreover, from Bayes’ rule,
Pr(i = g |e∗ ) = pi
pi + (1− pi)λ (A.10)
where λ is the probability that the bad incumbent pools. So, using (A.10), the pooling condition
becomes
γσ∆u
pi
pi + (1− pi)λ ≥ A (A.11)
If s ≥ A, the bad incumbent has a strong incentive to pool, so (A.11) holds at λ = 1. If s ≤ Api ,
the incentives to pool are so weak that so (A.11) does not hold even at λ = 0 and so the incumbent
always separates. If s ∈ [A, Api ], the bad incumbent must randomize with a probability λ than makes
him just indifferent between the two options i.e. λ must solve (A.11) holding at equality. This gives
λ =
pi
1− pi
(
s
A
pi
− 1
)
(A.12)
as required. 
Proof of Proposition 2. First assume σ∆u(θ) ≤ A, so that λ = 0. Then, (12) gives p = 0.5.
Now assume A ≤ σ∆u(θ) ≤ Api so that λ ∈ [0, 1]. Then, using (8) to substiute out λ in (12), after
simplification, we obtain
p =
1
2
− γpi∆u(θ)
(
σ∆u(θ)
A
− 1
)
(A.13)
By inspection of (A.13), p is strictly decreasing in σ, θ. Finally, assume σ∆u(θ)pi ≥ A so that
λ = 1. Then, (12) becomes
p =
1
2
− γ(1− pi)∆u(θ) (A.14)
By inspection of (A.14), p is decreasing in θ. 
Proof of Proposition 4. From (16) and Proposition 1 if s ≤ A, then λ = 0. Consequently, by
inspection of (16), (15), e2 is increasing in σ, θ, both directly and via the fact that an increase in s
A.2
reduces p. If s ≥ Api , λ = 1, from (16), e2 is independent of σ but increasing in θ, as in this case,
p is still decreasing in θ from Proposition 1. Finally, if A < s < Api , then, using (A.12), after some
simplification, we can show that
(1− pi)(1− λ)
pi + (1− pi)λ s =
A
pi
− s (A.15)
Then, combining (A.15) and (16), we obtain
Pr(i = g |win) = pi
(
1 +
γ
p
(A− piσ∆u(θ))
)
(A.16)
Differentiating (A.16) with respect to σ, and remembering that p depends on σ, it can be shown
that if the elasticity of p with respect to s is high enough i.e.
− σ
p
∂p
∂σ
>
s
A
pi − s
(A.17)
then e2 is increasing in σ. An exactly similar condition holds for θ. 
A.3
Online Appendix
Table N.1: Resident population: place of birth and place of usual residence
Share of residents
born residence
province
Share of residents
born different
province of
residence region
Share of residents
born other regions
Share of residents
born residence
province
Share of residents
born different
province of
residence region
Share of residents
born other regions
Provinces
Agrigento 0.854 0.118 0.028 Messina 0.899 0.052 0.049
Alessandria 0.643 0.053 0.304 Milano 0.596 0.114 0.289
Ancona 0.796 0.070 0.133 Modena 0.704 0.087 0.209
Arezzo 0.750 0.085 0.165 Monza e della Brianza 0.518 0.257 0.225
Ascoli Piceno 0.807 0.060 0.133 Napoli 0.923 0.051 0.026
Asti 0.570 0.224 0.206 Novara 0.565 0.080 0.355
Avellino 0.809 0.147 0.044 Nuoro 0.836 0.119 0.045
Bari 0.915 0.042 0.043 Ogliastra 0.828 0.118 0.055
Barletta-Andria-Trani 0.853 0.111 0.036 Olbia-Tempio 0.621 0.268 0.111
Belluno 0.817 0.068 0.114 Oristano 0.780 0.160 0.060
Benevento 0.827 0.127 0.046 Padova 0.784 0.129 0.087
Bergamo 0.813 0.096 0.091 Palermo 0.924 0.045 0.030
Biella 0.603 0.166 0.231 Parma 0.724 0.068 0.208
Bologna 0.671 0.105 0.224 Pavia 0.607 0.148 0.245
Bolzano 0.891 0.023 0.086 Perugia 0.832 0.014 0.154
Brescia 0.839 0.067 0.094 Pesaro e Urbino 0.764 0.048 0.188
Brindisi 0.867 0.094 0.039 Pescara 0.677 0.188 0.135
Cagliari 0.827 0.115 0.058 Piacenza 0.737 0.037 0.226
Caltanissetta 0.838 0.135 0.027 Pisa 0.663 0.146 0.191
Campobasso 0.822 0.022 0.156 Pistoia 0.609 0.203 0.188
Carbonia-Iglesias 0.831 0.113 0.056 Pordenone 0.699 0.060 0.240
Caserta 0.761 0.173 0.066 Potenza 0.863 0.025 0.112
Catania 0.896 0.073 0.031 Prato 0.524 0.247 0.229
Catanzaro 0.894 0.049 0.057 Ragusa 0.897 0.072 0.031
Chieti 0.803 0.071 0.126 Ravenna 0.677 0.162 0.161
Como 0.601 0.205 0.193 Reggio Calabria 0.919 0.024 0.057
Cosenza 0.906 0.026 0.069 Reggio Emilia 0.674 0.111 0.215
Cremona 0.696 0.188 0.115 Rieti 0.655 0.197 0.148
Crotone 0.808 0.135 0.057 Rimini 0.656 0.104 0.241
Cuneo 0.780 0.104 0.117 Roma 0.729 0.042 0.230
Enna 0.809 0.165 0.026 Rovigo 0.778 0.097 0.126
Fermo 0.696 0.212 0.092 Salerno 0.859 0.093 0.049
Ferrara 0.770 0.073 0.156 Sassari 0.867 0.078 0.055
Firenze 0.715 0.106 0.179 Savona 0.602 0.086 0.312
Foggia 0.920 0.020 0.060 Siena 0.714 0.086 0.201
Forl`ı-Cesena 0.765 0.086 0.149 Siracusa 0.803 0.154 0.043
Frosinone 0.839 0.080 0.081 Sondrio 0.862 0.078 0.059
Genova 0.735 0.023 0.243 Taranto 0.845 0.093 0.062
Gorizia 0.661 0.172 0.167 Teramo 0.788 0.050 0.162
Grosseto 0.690 0.105 0.205 Terni 0.754 0.072 0.173
Imperia 0.615 0.048 0.337 Torino 0.658 0.053 0.290
Isernia 0.770 0.035 0.195 Trapani 0.902 0.063 0.035
L’Aquila 0.814 0.042 0.144 Trento 0.833 0.024 0.143
La Spezia 0.671 0.044 0.285 Treviso 0.777 0.122 0.101
Latina 0.666 0.156 0.178 Trieste 0.793 0.052 0.155
Lecce 0.912 0.040 0.048 Udine 0.794 0.066 0.140
Lecco 0.631 0.243 0.126 Valle d’Aosta 0.683 0.317
Livorno 0.664 0.156 0.180 Varese 0.622 0.122 0.256
Lodi 0.586 0.246 0.167 Venezia 0.766 0.124 0.110
Lucca 0.776 0.102 0.122 Verbano-Cusio-Ossola 0.702 0.067 0.231
Macerata 0.783 0.116 0.101 Vercelli 0.571 0.189 0.240
Mantova 0.710 0.083 0.207 Verona 0.829 0.041 0.130
Massa-Carrara 0.717 0.091 0.192 Vibo Valentia 0.850 0.098 0.051
Matera 0.815 0.036 0.149 Vicenza 0.837 0.085 0.078
Medio Campidano 0.744 0.216 0.040 Viterbo 0.648 0.176 0.175
Municipalities (largest cities only
Bari 0.897 0.050 0.053 Parma 0.707 0.064 0.229
Bologna 0.639 0.091 0.271 Perugia 0.813 0.014 0.174
Brescia 0.796 0.052 0.152 Prato 0.532 0.230 0.238
Catania 0.889 0.081 0.030 Ravenna 0.627 0.167 0.206
Firenze 0.695 0.098 0.207 Reggio Calabria 0.916 0.018 0.066
Genova 0.725 0.021 0.255 Reggio Emilia 0.705 0.059 0.236
Livorno 0.710 0.131 0.159 Roma 0.712 0.040 0.249
Messina 0.911 0.032 0.057 Taranto 0.864 0.058 0.078
Milano 0.587 0.092 0.321 Torino 0.596 0.063 0.341
Modena 0.702 0.069 0.228 Trieste 0.786 0.050 0.164
Napoli 0.940 0.029 0.031 Venezia 0.816 0.073 0.111
Padova 0.714 0.122 0.164 Verona 0.784 0.044 0.172
Palermo 0.915 0.054 0.031
i
Table N.2: Matrix of bilateral regional migration stocks
Region of Residence: [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20]
Region of Birth:
Piemonte [1] 0.737 0.105 0.048 0.011 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.008
Valle d’Aosta [2] 0.001 0.683 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Liguria [3] 0.013 0.011 0.726 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.009 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004
Lombardia [4] 0.031 0.027 0.031 0.797 0.018 0.017 0.014 0.028 0.012 0.008 0.012 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.008 0.006 0.009
Trentino Alto Adige [5] 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.885 0.006 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Veneto [6] 0.031 0.022 0.009 0.024 0.033 0.897 0.058 0.015 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003
Friuli-Venezia Giulia [7] 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.013 0.829 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
Emilia-Romagna [8] 0.008 0.008 0.017 0.014 0.006 0.008 0.005 0.798 0.011 0.005 0.016 0.008 0.006 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003
Toscana [9] 0.004 0.007 0.026 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.008 0.819 0.019 0.004 0.009 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003
Umbria [10] 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.008 0.841 0.006 0.012 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Marche [11] 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.010 0.004 0.012 0.865 0.012 0.021 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
Lazio [12] 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.009 0.007 0.014 0.042 0.014 0.795 0.027 0.020 0.008 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.008
Abruzzo [13] 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.011 0.018 0.860 0.032 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001
Molise [14] 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.011 0.833 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Campania [15] 0.027 0.013 0.022 0.026 0.010 0.011 0.022 0.038 0.039 0.025 0.020 0.048 0.018 0.053 0.961 0.009 0.034 0.011 0.004 0.006
Puglia [16] 0.035 0.010 0.014 0.030 0.008 0.010 0.015 0.025 0.013 0.009 0.020 0.018 0.019 0.031 0.004 0.952 0.052 0.005 0.003 0.003
Basilicata [17] 0.010 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.875 0.006 0.000 0.000
Calabria [18] 0.032 0.061 0.032 0.022 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.014 0.012 0.008 0.004 0.019 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.011 0.939 0.005 0.002
Sicilia [19] 0.042 0.017 0.033 0.032 0.009 0.011 0.017 0.022 0.025 0.009 0.008 0.018 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.011 0.966 0.006
Sardegna [20] 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.007 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.003 0.008 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.940
ii
Table N.3: MUNICIPAL PERFORMANCE EQUATION: RESTRICTED SAMPLES
Dep. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Municipal Performance
SC 0.2215*** 0.8353*** 0.8064*** 0.2028*** 0.8411*** 0.8111***
[0.025] [0.069] [0.067] [0.027] [0.075] [0.072]
SC X Term Limit -0.0953*** -0.3476** -0.3206** -0.0592 -0.3512** -0.3205**
[0.034] [0.146] [0.139] [0.039] [0.159] [0.152]
Term Limit 0.0207 0.0811* 0.0832* 0.0348 0.0798* 0.0823*
[0.063] [0.045] [0.044] [0.066] [0.045] [0.045]
Income -0.0740*** -0.1176*** -0.1158*** -0.0652*** -0.1193*** -0.1173***
[0.011] [0.007] [0.007] [0.012] [0.008] [0.008]
Grants -0.0007*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0008** -0.0006*** -0.0006***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Majority Coalition Left 0.1546** 0.0129 0.0165 0.1677* 0.0326 0.0359
[0.077] [0.037] [0.036] [0.087] [0.040] [0.040]
Majority Coalition Right 0.0316 0.1254*** 0.1233*** 0.0343 0.1438*** 0.1415***
[0.061] [0.030] [0.030] [0.069] [0.033] [0.033]
Small 0.0103 0.1211*** 0.1332*** 0.0199 0.1235*** 0.1247***
[0.047] [0.029] [0.029] [0.051] [0.031] [0.031]
First past the post -0.2331*** -0.1022*** -0.1045*** -0.1607* -0.0702* -0.0723*
[0.078] [0.036] [0.036] [0.086] [0.039] [0.039]
Incumbent Female 0.1219*** 0.0989*** 0.0994*** 0.1091** 0.0955*** 0.0961***
[0.046] [0.027] [0.027] [0.048] [0.029] [0.028]
Incumbent Age 0.0133 0.0107 0.0109 0.0123 0.0114 0.0117
[0.014] [0.008] [0.008] [0.014] [0.009] [0.008]
Incumbent Degree 0.0562 0.0210 0.0222 0.0586 0.0186 0.0174
[0.060] [0.035] [0.035] [0.065] [0.038] [0.038]
In. High Exper. and Skills 0.0094 0.0006 0.0003 -0.0104 -0.0044 -0.0046
[0.046] [0.026] [0.026] [0.049] [0.028] [0.028]
X Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Z x Term Limit YES YES YES YES YES YES
Method OLS IV IV OLS IV IV
Instruments Adj. Pop. Adj. Adj. Pop. Adj.
First Stage F-statistics 1253.50 1131.21 985.11 1000.30
p-values [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
First Stage F-statistics 671.73 349.43 297.44 304.88
p-values [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 117.16 109.60 112.922 105.364
p values [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Observations 43,860 37,826 37,826 31,809 32,672 32,672
R-squared 0.216 0.189 0.193 0.196 0.178 0.182
Sample Excl. MI, TO, RO Excl. MI, TO, RO Excl. MI, TO, RO Post 2011 Post 2011 Post 2011
Notes: standard errors clustered at municipal level in brackets, * = p < 0.1, **= p < 0.05, *** = p < 0.01. Dependent
variable is the Opencivitas Performance Indicators. Regional dummies, year dummies and municipal controls (Z) are
included in all regressions. Z includes per capita municipal income, per capita municipal grants from upper levels of
governments, population, share of population above 65 years old and below 15 years old. Social capital is the (standardized)
standard social capital index, in columns (2)and (5) social capital is instrumented with the population adjusted SC index
in columns (3)and (6) with the adjusted social capital index. X controls include: plurality rule elections for municipalities
with less than 15,000 inhabitants, no term limit dummy for municipalities with less than 3,000 inhabitants, majority
coalition Right (Left) coalition dummies, mayor’s age and aged squared, gender, education (university or high school
degree), occupation prior to mandate (high skill/low skill and experience relevant/non relevant to mandate).
iii
